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REPORT

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

NEW ADMINISTRATION FOR POLISH PORT OF SZCZECIN

An agreement to this effect was to have been signed recently in East Berlin. Representatives of the countries concerned have worked on the matter since the latter part of January 1953, but up to the present the East German press has not mentioned the matter. The agreement was to be formally ratified by the respective governments before 8 March 1953.

Together with the civil commissar, there will be a security commissar who will have authority to set aside any decisions of the civil commissar if they are prejudicial to security demands. This post is to alternate between the USSR and East Germany. The first security commissar is to be a Russian. Administration personnel in Szczecin are to be gradually replaced and 65 percent of the new personnel will be from East Germany, 20 percent from the USSR, and 15 percent from Poland. The police force will be provided by East Germany and the military garrison will be apportioned as follows: East Germany, 72.5 percent; USSR, 22.5 percent; and Poland, 5 percent. The entire civilian population is to be evacuated by 31 March 1953. All civilian maritime traffic is to cease by 31 July 1953 at the latest, and will be diverted to Kolobrzeg (Kolberg) and Rostock.

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The motives behind this agreement, which, in fact, deprives Poland of the suzerainty which she has enjoyed over Szczecin since the end of the war, are both military and political. The military motive is to develop Szczecin into a strongly fortified naval support base for the Soviet Navy for operations in the southern and western Baltic. Thus Szczecin will be the Soviet Fleet's most advanced base for heavy vessels, which have hitherto been based at Riga.

The political motive is partially a consequence of the military. As is known, cooperation between the Soviets and the Poles has not been the best. The Soviets have more confidence in the Germans than in the Poles as far as alertness and energy are concerned. By pushing the Poles out of the way, pressure is simultaneously brought to bear on the government in Warsaw.

The first sign that Poland is in disfavor at present was the fact that Poland's protest to the USSR against the East German "national army" was completely disregarded. The Soviets have, in the same manner, refused to take notice of Poland's anxiety over the Polish-German boundary agreement. This was signed on behalf of East Germany by Foreign Minister Dertinger. Immediately after Dertinger was arrested as a "spy," Poland requested new assurances that the agreement was valid despite the "spy's" signature. Up to now the Poles have not received a reply from either the USSR or East Germany.

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